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WelfareAspects of Government Issue of Indexed Bonds
ABSTRACT
Government issue of bonds indexed to the price level has long been
recommended by economists, to no observed effect. Recently skepticism has
been expressed about the real effects of such government action, or indeed
of any government financial intermediation. This paper examines two main
approaches that might argue for government issue of indexed bonds. The first
asks what financial intermediation can be provided by government that the
private sector cannot provide. The answer is that the government can use
its taxation powers to make possible intergenerational risk sharing that
private markets cannot. This argument suggests government issue of bonds
indexed to wage income. The second approach discusses optimal forms of
government debt issue in light of the government's ability to manipulate
the payoffs on debt which has an uncertain real return. In this context
indexed debt has the potential advantage of enforcing consistency in govern-





(415) 497—9175Revised March 1982
WELFARE ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT ISSUE OF INDEXED BONDS
Stanley Fischer*
Economists' discussions of the welfare aspects of government issue of
indexed bonds are of less practical than intellectual interest. Governments
in inflationary difficulties issue indexed bonds and those that can avoid it,
do not. It is nonetheless worth discussing whether economic analysis provides
any rationale for government issue of either indexed or nominal bonds, or in
general for government financial intermediation.'
Recent analyses of government financial intermediation suggest government
issue of indexed bonds is at best irrelevant (Levhari and Liviatan, 1976, and
Wallace, 1981) and may well be harmful (Peled, 1978). In this paper I make
two main arguments. First, there is a role for government financial
intermediation to provide intergenerational risk sharing that private markets
cannot——but this does not directly suggest government issue of price—level
indexed bonds. Second, the question of why governments do not issue indexed
debt is the wrong one to ask: the more appropriate question is why governments
issue nominal debt. In this context, I argue that the presumption of stability
of the price level combined with frictions that are associated with indexed
debt, led to nominal debt as the standard form of government liability. As
the presumption of price level stability disappears, indexed debt is more
likely to be and should be issued.
Because the paper is directed to government issue of indexed bonds, I
do not discuss private non—issue of such bonds. That question was taken up
in an earlier paper (Fischer, 1977). It would be a mistake to build too
convincing a theory explaining private non—issue of indexed bonds since price—
level indexed mortgages have now been privately introduced in the United States.22
1. Review
It is well known that many of the most distinguished of past economists,
including Jevons (1875), Marshall (1925), Keynes (1927) and Fisher (1934)
advocated government issue of index bonds. Jevons, Marshall and Fisher spent
more time discussing the virtues of creation of a reliable price index than
those of issue of index bonds; they seem to have taken it for granted that
once a reliable index was available, it would be used in both private and
government transactions3—--unless the price level was stabilized through
appropriate monetary policy.
Subsequently other economists have argued for government issue of
indexed bonds; few economists have shared the opposition of practical men
and central bankers, though skepticism has recently become more common.
The arguments in favor are:
(1) Indexed bonds would provide the economy with a safe real asset
it otherwise does not have, and which is needed for optimal risk sharing.
(ii) Monetary policy could operate more accurately if indexed bonds
were introduced (Tobin, 1971). Indexed bonds are seen as a closer substitute
for physical capital than are other government liabilities. Monetary policy
should aim to control q, the market price of installed capital; such control
is more accurately achieved through changes in the quantity of indexed
rather than nominal bonds.
(iii) Government issue of an indexed bond would (a) encourage saving
and reduce inflationary pressure, and (b) encourage portfolio holders to
shift away from money toward bonds, implying that deficits can be financed
at a lower real rate than is possible when nominal bonds are issued (Bach
and Musgrave, 1941, in the context of wartime financing).3
(iv) ".. .byimposing upon the government a contingent liability
dependent on its failure to check inflation, the flotation of stable
purchasing power bonds would exert a wholesome pressure upon Congress to
adopt aggressive anti—inflationary policies" (Bach and Musgrave, op. cit.).
(v) By creating inflation, the government has systematically cheated
purchasers of nominal bonds, particularly small savers. This is not desirable
and would not happen if indexed bonds were made available to the public
(Friedman, 1974, Tobin, 1971).
In this paper I concentrate on arguments (i), (iv), and (v), briefly
commenting on the remaining points.
The recent skepticism about government issue of an indexed bond is
based largely on a number of neutrality theorems for government finance and
financial intermediation:
Ni (Barro, 1974) Debt financing of deficits has no different effects
than tax financing.
N2 (Levhari—Liviatan, 1976) Government intermediation in indexed bonds
has no real effects.
N3 (Wallace, 1981) Open market operations between money and bonds have
no real effects.
N4 (Peled, 1978) Any efficient equilibrium attainable with indexed
bonds can also be attained without them; if indexed bonds make a
difference they make things worse.
An associated meta—theorem is
N5: If indexed bonds were a good idea, the private sector would
already have invented them.4
Theorems Ni and N2 turn on the internalization of the governinentts
budget constraint by the private sector. Thus, for instance, when the
government in Levhari—Liviatan issues index bonds in exchange for nominal
bonds, it is simultaneously incurring a liability to pay out more in real
terms and less in nominal terms in the future. These future liabilities
will one way or another be paid off by the private sector, which therefore
is not fundamentally in any different position than it was before. This
argument assumes both types of debt were in existence before the government
undertook its intermediating activities.
Theorems N3 and N4 depend on the interpretation of money as purely a
store of value, the role it typically plays in overlapping generations models.
When money acts only as store of value, there is little or nothing that bonds
can do that money cannot, particularly when the stock of money can be adjusted
to affect its real rate of return.
Assumptions other than those underlying Ni through N4 have been pursued.
In particular, Helpman and Sadka (1979) derive rules for the optimal financing
of the government's budget, where the choices are among taxes, bonds, and
money. The choice between taxes and bonds is meaningful because it is
assumed individuals maximize over a finite horizon and no lump—sum taxes are
available. The choice between bonds and money is determinate because money
is viewed as providing productive services that bonds do not. This notion
is represented by putting money in the utility function. The Helpman-Sadka
framework produces results that differ from Ni, N3 and N4, though they do not
explicitly discuss N3 and N4. Because their framework is one of certainty,
they do not consider government financial intermediation.5
In this paper I first examine the question of the government's potential
role as financial intermediary (argument (i) above), and show that the
government can indeed make a positive difference by issuing securities and
using its taxing power to produce appropriate patterns of returns. The
difference arises from the government's ability to use taxes to enforce
intergenerational risk sharing.
I then briefly discuss using an optimal tax framework, like that of
Helpman and Sadka, to analyze optimal forms of government debt issue when
there is uncertainty. It is in this context that the Modigliani—Millertype
neutrality theorems outlined above are relevant: the framework suggests that
the government will optimally run deficits or surpluses on occasion, but it
does not provide any guidance to the type of debt that should be issued or
bought.
To understand government issue of nominal versus indexed bonds, it is
necessary to move to arguments like point (iv) above. The paper therefore
discusses government issue of nominal and indexed debt in a context where
dynamic inconsistency of government policy is possible. I conclude with a
brief discussion of the remaining arguments reviewed above for government
issue of indexed bonds.6
2. Government Financial Intermediation for Intergenerational Risk Sharing
In this section I outline a simple model in which government financial
intermediation makes intergenerational risk sharingpossible.4 The assumptions
are those of the Samuelson (1958) overlapping generations model. To begin
with, assume there is only one type of person, N born each period. Each
person lives two periods and has a utility functiondefined over consumptions
in the two periods. Random non—storable endowments are received in each
period.




in the two periods of life. The distributions of the endowments are
identical over time and not serially correlated, with
(2) w1(t) + W2(t)
W
C is the first period consumption of an individual born in period t;C1
is second period consumption of that individual. is information
available in period t.
In the simplest environment, all individuals within each generation
are identical in tastes and endowment. There is no reasonfor trade among
members of any one generation and nothing to trade with membersof other7
generations. Each generation therefore consumes its endowments. For
convenience, assume the utility function is separable and logarithmic, in
which case
(3) E[U( )]= in+ E in wr1




> , = E(W(t))<




Trade within a generation can take place if there are differences in
tastes or endowments. For instance, if endowments are identical and the
function U( )in(1) is the same for all individuals, but rates of time
preference differ, the more patient will lend to the less patient. Markets
in all second period contingent commodities may exist, and each individual
can be thought of as maximizing subject to a wealth constraint given by
the market value of the endowment. If tastes are homothetic, and given
the same U( )functionsand distributions of endowments, a single second
period composite asset can be created. But in general that will not be
possible.8
If the utility functions differ in risk aversion, the less risk averse
will be willing at a price to destabilize their consumptions relative to the
pattern of endowments in the second period, enabling the more risk averse to
have a more stable pattern of consumption.
Will this intragenerational trading produce a safe real asset? A
complete market equilibrium will call for a full menu of contingent
commodities, with agents either buying or selling the contingent commodities
in different proportions, depending on their tastes and endowments. If there
is a full set of contingent commodities, then a safe real asset can be
created, which will pay off one unit of consumption in each second period
state of nature.
Whether such an asset will actually be created when there is a full
set of markets depends on costs of transactions. Any type of model in which
there is some type of fixed cost for dealing in an asset will lead to
repackaging of contingent commodities in forms that fit the excess demand
patterns of consumers for second period contingent commodities. For instance,
a safe real asset is most likely to be produced if there is some notion of
essential consumption, represented for example by the Stone—Geary utility
function U(C—C), C >0,where U'(O) is infinite, and if many people have no
second period endowment at all.
If there is not a full set of contingent commodities, then invention of
a safe bond changes the consumption possibilities of economic agents. Assuming
that transaction costs are ultimately the reason for nonexistence of particular
markets, invention ofa safe real asset would again be more likely under the
circumstances outlined at the end of the previous paragraph.9
The role of government in a model of this type is limited, perhaps to
ensuring that contracts are carried out. There might be some difficulties
in this regard if, for instance, the second period endowments are wages, and
if human capital is not tradable. In that event the government ideally would
want to intervene to reproduce the private sector equilibrium.5
Given the constraint of no intergenerational trade, the equilibrium
attained in models of this type with a full set of contingent markets can be
described as constrained Pareto efficient. But there may be possibilities
for intergenerational trade, along grounds made familiar by Samuelson (1958).
Optimal Intergenerational Allocations
The possibilities for intergenerational trade depend on the pattern of
endowments. For instance, if the desired pattern of trade always involves
transfers from young to old, the introduction of money or government bonds
will bring about a better equilibrium than is possible with purely
intergenerational trade. The allocation is better in that every generation
is made better off——so long as it is assumed that the horizon is infinite.
The assumed pattern of endowments here highlights the possibilities for
intergenerational risk smoothing. Specifically, the assumption in (2) is
that the total endowment each period is nonrandom and constant. It is only
the division of the endowment between the generations that is uncertain.
Clearly allocations are possible in which every generation has a
nonrandom pattern of consumption over its lifetime. But direct
intergenerational trade is not possible. The introduction of money will
not itself solve the problem since sometimes the optimal arrangements will
call for transfers from old to young, which cannot be achieved with
money held by the old.10
Return now to the case where tastes of all agents are identical. An
optimal allocation in some sense is one in which consumption in each period
for each individual is certain, and in which the allocation between young
and old reflects time preference. For instance, if the utility functions
are logarithmic as in (3), consider the solution to the following problem:
(5) Max V(W,y) =in(W-y) +in y
{y}
which implies







This allocation is optimal in the following sense: suppose individuals
are told before knowing their first period endowments what the probability
distribution of the endowments is, and what the technical possibilities for
trade are. Then they will choose this allocation.6 This optimality
criterion may be objected to on the grounds that it seems to imply prior
(to their existence) agreement by economic agents on the rules of resource
allocation.
The issues here are deep and not simply resolved. But the criterion is
appealing because it is clear that some criterion of this type is in practice
used in establishing property rights, in the sense that it is assumed the
rights will be binding on agents as yet unborn and that notions of fairnss
are used in discussing the establishment of therules.7 There is certainly11
no presumption in most societies that anyone is free to opt out of paying
taxes if benefits fall short of contributions, except in the limited sense
that emigration is typically permitted.
There is need for some criterion of optimality since the allocation
implied by (6) is not ex post a Pareto improvement for all generations.
Some generation might have been lucky and had high drawings in both periods
of their lives. They would lose under the allocation (6).
Institutional Arrangements: Can the Private Sector Do It?
How is this allocation to be achieved? There are several possibilities,
all involving the use of taxes.
(i) The simplest in the present model is for the government to take
command of all resources and allocate them between the generations as implied
by (6).
(ii) The endowments of the old could be confiscated in each period and
given to the young. At the same time the first old generation could be given
fiat money, as in the original consumption loans model. The old sell money
to the young in exchange for goods; the allocation is the same as (6).
(iii) The government could act as a financial intermediary, each
period buying the rights to the second period endowment of the currently
young, and paying out to the currently old the amount that generates the
resource allocation (6). It may also be necessary to use taxes and transfers
to effect the appropriate allocation.
The first two institutional arrangements require direct government
intervention. The question pursued now is whether the third set of
arrangements requires any government action, or whether alternatively a12
private financial intermediary could produce the allocation (6), without a
government role. The question is whether use of taxation is necessary to
achieve (6) when financial intermediation is available. If not, a private
financial intermediary could be set up that would generate zero cash flow
each period, balancing its payments with its receipts. If taxes and transfers
are needed, government action is necessary.
To study the operation of the financial intermediary, it is convenient
to assume there is a discrete number of states of nature, indexed by j,
j =1,••,J.Let p7.(t) be the price in terms of period t goods for
delivery of one unit of the consumption good in state of nature j in period
(t+1). The probability of state j occurring is q., and q. is constant over
time. Taxes in amount T.(t) are levied on the old in state of nature j in
period t, and transferred to the young. The taxes may be negative.
The currently young maximize
J
(7) E[U( )] =Zn





c1.(t)+p2.(t)C2.(t+l) =W1.(t)+ P2(t)(W21(t+1) —T.(t+1))+ T.(t)
j=1 J=1
Y(t)13
The new notation is: C2.(t+1) is consumption by the old in state of nature j
in period (t+1); W2.(t+1) is the endowment received by the old in state of
nature j in period (t+1); W1.(t) is the endowment of the young in state of
nature i in period t. It is known that state of nature i has occurred.





To attain the optimal allocation (6), it is necessary that
(10) C1.(t) =
(11) C2.(t—1)--!
w i =1, J
From (8) and (10),
(12) Y(t) =W
From (12), (9) and (11),
(13) p2.(t) =q.
Thus actuarially fair prices should be charged for contingent commodities.14
Using (13), we return to (12) to obtain
T(t) +wi( )+ q.(W2.(t+1) -T.(t+1))W
or
(14) T(t) +w1(t)w1 + (t+1)
Onthe right—hand side of (14), we have a term which is the expectedvalue of
secondperiod taxation of the old. Assuming taxesare only state and not
timedependent,
(14)' T. + W =W+ T
1 11 1
where T isthe expected value of second period taxation.
From (14)' it is clear that the optimal allocation can be achieved for




Thus the financial intermediation scheme cannot operate without use of taxes
and transfers, though it can operate with expected taxes equal to zero.
Given the result that contingent commodity prices are, in the optimal
allocation, actuarially fair, we can describe the operations of thefinancial
intermediary quite simply. Its resource flows are shown in Table1. Each15
Table 1: Resource Flows to the Financial Intermediary
Inf lows Outflows
Endowments of the old
W2(t) Purchase of endowment of
current young
Purchases of index bonds B(t) B(t—1) Payments to holders of
by current young index bonds (currently old)
T(t) Net transfers to the young16
period it buys the second period endowments of the current young at their
expected value, as prescribed by (13). It also pays out claims owned by the
current old. These can be thought of as indexed bonds, paying the same amount
in each state of nature. Resource inflows come from the endowments of the
current old, which were purchased last period, and from sales of index bonds
to the current young. Any excess of inf low over outflow is handled by making
a distribution to the young; alternatively any excess outflow is paid for by
taxing the young.
It is worth noting that the financial intermediation solves two
allocational difficulties. First, the intermediation makes intergenerational
risk sharing possible. Second, the government makes it possible for each
generation to choose the optimal time profile of consumption. The first
function can be performed without the second being satisfied. For instance,
suppose that both generations alive at the same time can contract before
their endowments are revealed. They will in general want to trade in
contingent commodities. But such trading will still leave further gains
from intergenerational trade, in that given the pattern of endowments
described by (4), each generation would likely want the opportunity of
saving in the first period.
Dynamics of the Financial Intermediary
The financial intermediation scheme can be instituted in a period in
which the division of resources between the generations is about average,
and in this case will make the first period old better off and raise the
ex ante expected utility of all subsequent generations. For example, again
using the logarithmic utility function (3), consider the introduction of the17
scheme in period t,withpurchase by the government of the rights to
for which it pays W2. It sells to the young an amount of bonds
B(t) implied by
(15) Max £n (W1(t) + —B(t))+2n B(t)
{B(t)}
or
(16) B(t) =--- (W1(t)
+
The government's net resource flow in period tis
(17) B(t) —= -i1•• [w1(t)
—
w2]
If W1(t) is equal to W1 or close to that level (see assumption (4) that
> W),the scheme generates a first period surplus that can be given
to the old.
The dynamics of first period consumption are given by
(18) = + (W1(t)
—
Thisconverges to (6). Provided W1(t) is close to W1, the scheme increases
the ex ante expected utility of all generations. However, if the scheme were
started when the first generation had very high W1(t), there would be a large
demand for bonds. The next generation would accordingly have low first period
consumption and could therefore be made worse off, in an expected utility
sense, by the introduction of the scheme.18
Choosing Among the Schemes
At the present level of abstraction there is nothing to choose
these schemes. Additional elements would have to be included in the
to make the choice determinate. If there are differences in tastes,
the government cannot discriminate between economic agents, then the direct
allocation method (i) is less likely to be optimal. The difficulty is that
the total amount allocated to the young generation may be wrong. There will
subsequently be trading within that generation, but there is no mechanism for
them to trade with other generations. Neither of mechanisms (ii) nor (iii)
suffers from this particular difficulty.
Choice between (ii) and(iii) requires more explicit modeling of the
effects of taxation of second period endowments (in (ii)) as compared with
purchase of the endowment (as in (iii)). If the endowments are lump sum,
as so far assumed, there is again no basis for choice. However, we might
assume that the endowments represent, for example, labor income and that
labor supply responds to wages. In that case the imposition of taxes under
scheme (ii) in general distorts the labor supply decision. But there is
similarly a severe moral hazard problem under scheme (iii) where individuals
have sold their labor income forward. In principle a contract could be drawn
up that would specify the amounts to be worked in each stateof nature; with
such an agreement the optimal allocation could be attained. But if the
government cannot discriminate between workers, it is difficult to see how
such optimal agreements could ever be negotiated.
This is to say that it is very unlikely that there is a way of
attaining the optimal allocations. There is no way the government can




endowments (presumably human capital) or taxing. If it is not possible for
the government in effect to deal in human capital, it will haveto use
taxation along with security issues to improve the allocation ofresources.
It will in general be able to improve the allocation ofresources by engaging
in intergenerational transactions, but because it does not havelump—sum
taxes, it cannot achieve a first best allocation.8 And because it cannot
achieve the first best solution, it will not generally beoptimal to eliminate
uncertainty entirely.
Aggregate Uncertainty
To this point it has been assumed that the aggregate endowment is
certain, although its distribution between the generations is not. Suppose
now that W(t), the aggregate endowment, is uncertain. It will still be true,
unless the endowments are perfectly positively correlated, that there will be
risk—sharing grounds for government financial intermediation.
There are again J states of nature, j =1,"•,J.The optimality
criterion for the logarithmic utility function now becomes
J J
(19) Max q.2nC1.(t)+ n c2k(t+1)
{C1.(t), C2k(t+1)} i=1 k=1
subject to C1.(t) +C2.(c)WJt),i=1,••.,.3,for all t.
Theoptimal allocation specifies the consumption levels for both generations







HereW. is the aggregate endowment in state of nature i.
This allocation can once again be brought about through the three
schemes, including government financial intermediation in scheme (iii),
described above. Prices and transfers are chosen to replicate the
allocation (20). These prices are no longer equal to the probabilities
of the states of nature, but in addition reflect aggregate endowment in
the state of nature. The financial intermediary will no longer buy second
period endowments for an amount equal to their expected value. Nor is it
natural any longer to think of the financial intermediary dealing in indexed
bonds, since the amount consumed in each second period state of nature will
depend on the state and no longer be state independent.
Of course, if the intermediary chooses to provide a full menu of
contingent commodities, it is possible to buy an indexed bond in the sense
of a financial asset that provides a payoff that is constant. But with the
postulated patterns of endowments and utility functions, there is no one who
will want to consume identical amounts in each state of nature.
If the financial intermediary wants to reduce the number of assets in
which it deals, the natural index to use is the aggregate amount of goods
available in each state, since consumption for each individual will be
proportional to the aggregate endowment in each state. This is a result of
the assumption of identical homothetic tastes.21
3. Government Financial Intermediation and Indexed Bonds
The analysis above establishes that there may be a role for government
financial intermediation that private markets cannot provide. It demonstrates
that meta—theorem N5 above does not establish the optimality of the status quo
in all situations.
But the role of government as financial intermediary has to be related
to the source of the private sector's inability to provide the appropriate
bundle of assets. If the government's advantage derives from its claims on
future labor income, then it is likely optimal for the government to sell
claims on labor income in different states. Claims on the income of capital
are already tradable. The institution of social security does provide some,
though nontradable, claims on future labor income.
The improvement that can be expected from financial intermediation of
the type described in the previous section depends on the correlation of
returns on human capital with returns on other assets. Those returns are
in fact highly correlated. Further, the wages earned by different generations
of labor alive at the same time are also strongly correlated. No great
reduction of risk for the individual should therefore be expected from optimal
risk—sharing arrangements provided by the government based on its ability to
tax future labor income.
The case for government financial intermediation outlined above
implicitly uses as its definition of an indexed bond, a bond that pays off
the same amount of goods in each state of nature. But since there is no
money and no price level, the bonds are not indexed in the conventional
sense that the amount of money paid out to bondholders is related to the
behavior of the price level. To discuss the issue of indexed bonds in this
sense, the model has to include money and prices. I now discuss a framework
that seems ideal for analyzing government financial policy in such a context.22
4. Optimal Government Financing and Index Bonds
Consider a model in which individuals maximize over two period life-
times, supplying labor services, using money, and able also to save by the
accumulation of capital. The government has only distorting taxes at its
disposal. Potentially, any asset could serve as medium of exchange. But
it is technically difficult to pay interest on securities that change hands
in the day—to—day process of exchange and for that reason there is a separate
noninterest—bearing asset, money, that serves as medium of exchange. Technical
innovations in the process of exchange occur randomly. This last assumption
is an important one, for it means that there are specific risks associated
with the return to money and that money therefore will not necessarily serve
in such a model to produce exactly the same pattern of returns as real assets.
Consumers maximize an expected utility function of the form:
(21)
EE[C. Cr', Lt, ft±1 s]]]
where f( )representsthe services provided by the holding of money.
L is the amount of labor supplied. Random variable is a technological
factor representing the ability of money to perform its utility or labor-
saving services; uncertainty about future values ofgenerates uncertainty
about future price levels as of any given values of the remaining variables
in the economy. Inclusion of real balances in the utility function is a
method of ensuring a demand for money even if interest is earned on other
assets.23
First, return to the optimal intergenerational risk sharing with
aggregate certainty model of Section 2, omitting government and labor
supply from (21). Suppose there is a given constant money stock. The
constant money stock does not in this context generate efficient
intergenerational risk sharing, since uncertainty about the rate of return
on money does not provide the certain one—for—one intertemporal tradeoff
that society faces between consumption of the generations.
This price level uncertainty provides a role for government in the
model of Section 2, either as issuer of an indexed bond or to conduct
monetary policy. Monetary policy will consist of transfers to the old that
produce price level certainty. With money as a safe asset, there is no need
for indexed bonds, provided appropriate resource transfers are made between
the generations. If monetary policy cannot operate rapidly enough to
stabilize the price level, money will be an unsafe asset and there will be
room for indexed bonds. Indeed, the government might want to lend in nominal
terms to the private sector, enabling it to hedge the risks of price level
changes. At the same time the government would continue to issue the safe
or indexed bond.
Analysis of optimal government policy in such a model requires full
specification of the optimal tax problem. A model of the above type under
certainty has already been analyzed by Helpman and Sadka (1979) who show,
under the assumption of no lump—sum taxation, that the government optimally
will sometimes want to use deficit financing. When uncertainty is introduced,
we should think of the model in terms of contingent commodities. The optimal
state—contingent taxing scheme for given patterns of government spending will
involve purchases or sales of contingent commodities.24
Borrowing implies merely that the government collects resources today
that will be paid for by delivery of commodities in future contingencies——
which commodities will be provided through taxation, money issue, or future
borrowing. The positions that the government takes in various markets for
contingent commodities can be viewed as determining the optimal financing
of the debt. In this sense, the type of debt issued by the government
matters: if it takes another position, the real equilibrium is changed.
Financial Operations
Once government positions in each market for contingent commodities
have been optimally determined, the government can engage in financial
intermediation by taking, at the equilibrium prices of contingent commodities,
positions of zero net worth across contingent markets. For instance, it can
buy contracts for future delivery of wheat and sell contracts for future
delivery of corn. If the profits or losses are merely to be handed back to
the private sector in a neutral way, then these further financial
transactions have no real effects. For the government to return the
proceeds in a neutral way, it holds constant optimally determined planned
spending, taxes, and transfers within each state of nature, aside from
those arising from its financial intermediation activities. Thus it
disposes of its wheat by selling the wheat to the market and distributing
the profits or losses——it is doing nothing except churning the market.
Such financial intermediation cannot in a complete contingent market setup
do any good.
What is the relationship between the public finance framework of
optimal debt determination outlined above and the five neutrality theorems,
Ni through N5? Ni does not apply because individuals maximize over only25
two periods, and therefore cannot engage in intergenerational risk sharing.
To the extent that the horizon is lengthened or effectively made infinite,
more intergenerational risk sharing should be expected from within the
private sector. The case for government issue of special types of debt
would then depend on the absence of markets for human capital and the
inability of individuals from different families to arrange smoothing that
is possible through pooling of the risks of within—generation wage incomes.
There is a sense in which neutrality theorem N2 holds.
Namely, there is under reasonable assumptions a determinate optimal pattern
of government spending, taxation, and money issue in each state of nature.
This optimal pattern implies net supplies of contingent commodities. It is
possible to superimpose on this pattern a variety of government financial
operations that have no real effects provided the underlying real activities
of the government are unaltered. But it is precisely that underlying pattern
of real activities that implies the optimal pattern of government financing.
Neutrality theorem N3 does not hold when it is optimal to pay interest
on debt and when it is technically impossible to do so on money, as shown by
Helpman and Sadka. Theorem N4 depends on the availability of lump—sumtaxes.
N5 was discussed extensively in Section 2 of this paper.
Government Issue of Indexed Debt
In the above framework, optimal government policy implies a particular
pattern of net supplies and demanof contingent commodities by the government.
The type of securities——that is, packages of contingent commodities—--issued by
the government will depend, as in Section 2, on the advantages the government
has over the private sector in issuing valued securities, and on the small
frictions associated with the packaging of assets. For instance, if many26
investors have very high risk aversion and no future endowments, they would
essentially want to buy only indexed bonds. Rather than require them to mix
their own indexed bonds, or leaving the job for private financial institutions,
it could be cheaper for the government to do so.
The framework is not, however, totally compelling, except as a way of
organizing thought, for its fails to explain why governments have traditionally
been assumed to have an obligation to issue safe debt. Nor does it handle the
question of which markets in contingent commodities are in factavailable at
any time Without knowing why markets are missing——and manyare missing——we
cannot in some ultimate sense pronounce on the desirability of alternative
forms of government deficit finance.27
5. Government Debt Issue: An Alternative Approach
The general presumption that government deficits should be financed
by the issue of safe debt probably arises from the fear that the government
is big enough to manipulate the returns on any other type of debt in a way
that will be disadvantageous to the lenders. In more modern terms, the issue
is one of the dynamic inconsistency of policy (Kydland and Prescott, 1977,
Fischer, 1980). Given this view, indexed debt would be the standard form of
government liability, particularly since the government is exceptionally well
placed to affect the inflation rate.
From this perspective, the right question to ask about government debt
is not why it is not indexed, but how it ever came to be nominal. One
argument that may have some appeal is that the government by promising to
pay off in dollars (or the currency of the country) is making the only
promise it can with certainty keep, since it prints the dollars. However,
nominal debt predates fiat currencies,9 so this cannot be the explanation.
The predominance of nominal government debt in countries with relatively
stable inflation histories derives from frictions associated with indexed debt.
The first friction is the delay in the collection and publication of price
data, which means that indexed debt is not conveniently used in short—term
transactions. Second, as often pointed out, variations in relative prices
imply that different price indexes are appropriate for different people and
purposes'°: when inflation rates are reasonably predictable, there is no
assurance that the appropriate real value of indexed debt is more predictable
than the value of nominal debt.
Once the economy has accustomed itself to using nominal debt and
institutions, and given the frictions associated with indexed debt, there
are costs to innovating by introducing an indexed bond, and no assurance28
that the social surplus from doing so is appropriable by the innovator.
There is no presumption, even if there were no government advantage in the
issue of indexed debt, that indexed debt would be introduced by the private
sector at precisely the right time. Indeed, given a nominal tax system,
there is a presumption that some government action is needed to get the
process under way.
Government innovation comes when the pressures to move away from
nominal contracting become strong enough: these pressures arise in part
from the exhaustion of devices for enforcing cheap nominal financing of
deficits. They arise also from the dissatisfaction of existing lenders to
the government who have suffered from the effects of unanticipated inflation
on the real value of their assets.
The notion that indexed debt is an incentive for more consistent
behavior by government, argued in point (iv) above by Bach and Musgrave, is
appealing, particularly given that governments typically do not appear to
behave in the ways that economists' models of optimizing governments suggest
they should. However, it is interesting briefly to explore the question of
whether governments should always honor past commitments. The existence of
a nominal debt makes it possible for the government very cheaply to impose
a capital levy (by inflating). The best of all possible worlds, if
governments acted optimally, might be one in which governments had the
option of imposing a capital levy in this way in emergencies, like wars.
Provided there is a political cost to violating past obligations, it may
be optimal to set up arrangements in which they can easily beviolated.11
Taking this logic a step further, we note the argument by Levhari—
Liviatan (1976) that the direction of the effect of past commitments on
current actions is ambiguous. If, in an emergency, inflation is the first29
line of increased government revenue, then the existence of indexed debt
may make the government response to difficulties more rather than less
inflationary.
Lest these speculations obscure the main message, I repeat the
argument of this section. Given the ability of the government to affect
the payoffs that it makes on debt whose return is uncertain, the general
presumption would be that governments should finance themselves with
indexed debt, as a means of encouraging consistent behavior. The
predominance of nominal debt results from frictions associated with the
use of indexed debt, and relies heavily on the presumption that price level
behavior is reasonably predictable. Once that presumption is lost,




Finally I turn to arguments (ii), (iii) and (v) for government issue
of indexed bonds. Argument (ii), that monetary policy could more accurately
affect q if there were indexed bonds, assumes that real bonds are a closer
substitute for capital than are nominal bonds. Empirically this turns out
not to be the case. It would nonetheless be useful to know what amarket
real rate of interest is and how it varies through time, and for that reason
issue of an indexed bond would be of assistance to monetary and fiscal
13
policy makers.
Argument (iii), that issue of indexed bonds would reduce the interest
cost borne by the Treasury for financing the debt, and also promote saving,
has been extensively investigated. If government debt issue is neutral, in
the sense of N2, then government issue of indexed bonds would have no real
effect. If the government issue of indexed debt changes its patterns of
taxation and money issue, then the effects on interest rates and saving
depend on how taxes and inflation rates are changed by theintroduction of
the indexed debt. An individual with given wealth, and given future tax
payments, will be willing to hold indexed debt at alower real return than
nominal debt if the remaining assets available are on balance not hedges
against inflation. Certainly, given the adverse effectsof inflation on
equity returns, the presumption is that individualswould be willing to
hold indexed bonds at lower real rates than nominal bonds——holding constant
future tax payments. The effects of the issue of indexed bonds on saving
depend on the responses of saving and labor supply to changesin the real
interest rate, topics on which there is little empiricalknowledge.1431
Finally, consider argument (v), that government issue of indexed bonds
is desirable on distributional grounds. In the United States the adverse
distributional consequences have been associated particularly with the U.S.
savings bonds program. The ability of the government to continue obtaining
financing through these instruments indicates a lack of access, for whatever
reason, to higher yielding dominating assets, and strongly suggests that a
part of the market would be made better off by government issue of indexed
bonds, or alternatively as now proposed, floating rate notes.15
At the theoretical level, this paper should be viewed as an exploratory
attempt to analyze the question of optimal government financial policy.
Previous analyses have tended to take the types of assets to be issued by
the government as given. There is as yet no satisfactory theory of what
types of assets governments should issue, and such a theory may require
further analysis of reasons for the absence of particular markets.
Because the analysis is exploratory, it cannot reach any firm conclusions
on the desirability or otherwise of government issue of indexed bonds. There
is no strong welfare argument for government issue of an indexed bond, at the
abstract level of this paper. But nor is there a strong argument against such
an issue. And the analysis certainly provides little explanation or
justification for the issue of nominal bonds.32
Footnotes
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to my discussants Eduardo Modiano and Stephen Ross and to participants in
seminars at M.I.T., Stanford, and Berkeley for comments and suggestions, to
Jeffrey Miron for research assistance, and to the National Science Foundation
and Hoover Institution for financial support.
1. For earlier examination of the issues, see Fischer (1975), Levhari and
Liviatan (1976), and Peled (1978), as well as references cited below.
2. See the Deseret News, September 10, 1981.I am indebted to J. Huston
McCulloch for this information.
3. Eagly (1967) suggests that Jevons and Marshall advocated use of a price
index in private rather than government transactions. However, reading of
Jevons (1884) and Marshall (1925) supports the view outlined above. Collier
(1969) and Fisher (1934) both survey the literature.
4. In his paper for this conference, Joseph Stiglitz (1981) independently
makes very similar arguments.
5. For analysis of social security and taxation as methods of overcoming
the absence of human capital markets, see the excellent paper by Nerton
(1981). Merton also discusses the case where the government has only
distorting taxes at its disposal and cannot produce the first best
allocation of resources.33
6. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), P. 340, provide references and discussion.
See also Peled (1978), who discusses the criterion under the heading Equal
Treatment Pareto Optimality, referring to discussion by Nuench (1977).
Peled is wary of the criterion, arguing that it is not compatible with a
requirement that individuals have the right to refuse to participate in a
cooperative procedure if that is costly. He conjectures that whenever the
optimality criterion used by economists is stronger than that used by
individual agents, private equilibria are likely to be non—optimal.
7. Robert Barro, in his summary discussion at the conference, argued that
use of this criterion was incompatible with the notion that individual
utility is not affected by the utility of subsequent generations. However,
the criterion can be thought of as follows. Suppose an intergenerational
arrangement can be introduced that will make existing generations better
off. How likely are future generations to repudiate the arrangement?
Future repudiation is more likely if subsequent generations see that, at
the time it was introduced, the scheme was known to benefit one generation
at the expense of specific future generations. But if it was reasonable to
think at the time of introduction of a new set of arrangements that future
generations would be benefitted, the future generations are more likely to
uphold the scheme. It will be seen below that introduction of governtnent
financial intermediation between generations can satisfy this criterion,
benefitting the current generation and increasing the utility expected for
all future generations.
8. Bhattacharya (1981) examines a related case.34
9. Nor can it seriously be believed that government debt of any type is
totally safe, in light of possible revolutions, debt repudiation and so
forth.
10. Michael (1979) examines variations in consumption bundles and associated
price indexes in a cross—section study.
11. Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, Flarcourt Brace, 1932, is worth quoting:
the benefits of a depreciating currency are not restricted to
the government. .. .Thosesecular changes. ..whichin the past
have depreciated money, assisted the new men and emancipated them
from the dead hand; they benefited new wealth at the expense of
old, and armed enterprise against accumulation. ..(p.87)
Of course he was only half serious: he concluded that it would be better to
handle redistributive and inheritance problems directly than through
(unanticipated) inflation. (p. 92)
12. It is difficult to see why the Treasury should not undertake an
experimental issue of indexed bonds, sold at auction. These could be
discount bonds, promising payment of a given real sum on a specific future
date. Tax treatment of the returns would have to be specified. The simplest
arrangement would be to make the returns nontaxable. Such a bond could quite
easily yield a negative real return in equilibrium.
13. This assumes that either monetary or fiscal policy decisions might
optimally react to changes in the real interest rate, a position I hold.
14. Bhattacharya (1979) examines the theoretical arguments.35
15. This argument takes the existence of the U.S. savings bonds program as
given. Ronald McKinnon suggested that the program would lose its rationale
if interest rate controls on financial intermediaries were lifted. In the
last few years the outstanding volume of savings bonds has been falling. At
the end of 1981 it was $68 billion, only about 6% of the value of total time
and savings deposits at financial intermediaries.36
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